Paradoxes of risk management: Social responsibility and self-exclusion in Dutch casinos by Kingma, S.F.
This article was downloaded by: [Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam]
On: 21 January 2015, At: 06:11
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Click for updates
Culture and Organization
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gsco20
Paradoxes of risk management: Social
responsibility and self-exclusion in
Dutch casinos
Sytze F. Kingmaa
a Department of Organization Sciences, VU University Amsterdam,
De Boelelaan 1081c, 1081 HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Published online: 28 May 2013.
To cite this article: Sytze F. Kingma (2015) Paradoxes of risk management: Social
responsibility and self-exclusion in Dutch casinos, Culture and Organization, 21:1, 1-22, DOI:
10.1080/14759551.2013.795152
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14759551.2013.795152
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or
howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising
out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &
Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-
and-conditions
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [V
rije
 U
niv
ers
ite
it A
ms
ter
da
m]
 at
 06
:11
 21
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
15
 
Paradoxes of risk management: Social responsibility and self-
exclusion in Dutch casinos
Sytze F. Kingma∗
Department of Organization Sciences, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1081c, 1081
HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
(Received 30 September 2011; final version received 9 January 2013)
This article deals with the basic contradictions of risk management and
responsibility regarding problem gambling and self-exclusions, and draws special
attention to the role knowledge production and science play in the construction
and evaluation of gambling risks. This remarkable case of corporate social
responsibility (CSR) is analyzed from a risk-governance perspective. It is
grounded on a case study of the CSR practice of the Dutch casino monopoly, in
particular the problem gambling mitigation and self-exclusion program of this
corporation. The intentions and operations of this ‘responsible gambling’ practice
constitute new business values and working norms. At the same time empirical
evaluations of the self-exclusion program reveal that despite all the efforts put in
the risk-management strategies, a significant part of the problem cannot be
addressed at all. This points toward a major paradox of risk management.
Overall the article highlights the ambiguous nature of risk management and
responsible gambling.
Keywords: risk management; corporate social responsibility; casinos; problem
gambling
1. Introduction
Legal casinos are closely associated with social responsibility first and foremost
because of the associations with gambling addiction and crime. In combination with
the morally often still controversial nature of gambling, risks of addiction and crime
make casino organizations also sensitive to reputational risks associated with bad pub-
licity. Gambling organizations therefore seek to minimize (or negate) these gambling
risks, often invest in social responsibility policies and guard their responsibility
image. This recent development in the gambling industry is addressed in the discourse
on ‘responsible gambling’ (Reith 2008; Cosgrave 2010; Thompson 2010; Smith and
Rubenstein 2011).
In the case of legal casinos, the core issue of corporate responsibility relates to mar-
keting initiatives in the area of player protection by means of voluntary programs in
which the casino corporation develops beyond-compliance policies that lead to the
reduction of negative externalities. Self-exclusion programs, in which gamblers are
offered the opportunity to exclude themselves, often temporarily, from the right to
access a casino venue, can be regarded as one of the most far-reaching management
tools for dealing with ‘problem gambling’. However, to make sure that this social
# 2013 Taylor & Francis
∗Email: s.f.kingma@vu.nl
Culture and Organization, 2015
Vol. 21, No. 1, 1–22, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14759551.2013.795152
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [V
rije
 U
niv
ers
ite
it A
ms
ter
da
m]
 at
 06
:11
 21
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
15
 
responsibility goes beyond ‘lip-service’, it is of great importance to analyze how
responsibility claims are actually realized in everyday organizational practice.
Indeed, the leading research question regarding responsible gambling and self-exclu-
sion in this article concerns the way corporate social responsibility (CSR) rhetoric
relates to CSR practice. Scientific research should for this purpose be considered inte-
gral to the establishment, monitoring and evaluation of any responsible gambling prac-
tice (Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, and Shaffer 2004, 153). It could even be argued that
knowledge about the adverse outcomes of commercial gambling is productive for
the constitution of gambling organizations and markets (Kingma 2004; Cosgrave
2010).
Responsible gambling will in this article first be related to the CSR literature. The
concept of CSR is particularly suited for addressing the productive role of risks because
contemporary meanings of CSR are closely associated with the anticipation, and the
mitigation and prevention of, negative externalities (Carroll 1999; Campbell 2006;
Pater and Lierop 2006; Maclagan 2008; Jackson and Apostolakou 2010). Recent
CSR understandings epitomize the way externalities are integrated in, and at the
same time extend the range of, corporate management. A key argument of this
article is that CSR in the case of contemporary casinos can be understood and analyzed
from a risk-governance perspective (Renn 2008). Such a perspective extends the notion
of the organization which becomes increasingly responsive to a network of external sta-
keholders and internalizes unintended and adverse consequences in the organization’s
culture and risk-management practices. This approach toward responsible gambling is
in line with the EU commission’s definition of CSR as ‘a concept whereby companies
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their
interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis’ (quoted in: Jackson and Apos-
tolakou 2010, 373). Jackson and Apostolakou claim that CSR now ‘forms part of risk
management activities of firms’, including the protection of ‘corporate and brand repu-
tation’ (Jackson and Apostolakou 2010, 373). Indeed, a concern for ‘reputational risk’
(Power 2007) is arguably one of the major drivers behind responsible gambling
programs.
Empirically, this article deals with the CSR of Holland Casino (HC), the operator of
the Dutch casino monopoly, in particular the so-called ‘addiction prevention’ policy
and ‘self-exclusion’ program of this corporation. Since the early 1990s this casino cor-
poration already claims to take social responsibility seriously and over the years devel-
oped measures to counter the bad consequences of ‘problem gambling’ (Kingma
2008b). HC claims to be successful in its CSR policies (Holland-Casino 2010). HC’s
CSR policies have in 2011 even been officially approved by the Dutch Court of
Audits (Algemene-Rekenkamer 2011). However, the measurement and assessment
of negative externalities in the case of casinos, and gambling more generally, is notor-
iously problematic and controversial (Smith, Hodgins, and Williams 2007). Assessing
responsibility claims becomes even more problematic if we seek to relate the negative
consequences and the effects of counter measures in a causal way to a single casino
company. In view of the issue of effectiveness and responsiveness, I will critically
evaluate the state of the self-exclusion literature and the self-exclusion practice at
HC, in particular an unprecedented and rather extensive research in which the preven-
tion policy and self-exclusion program of HC have been evaluated (Bruin de et al.
2001). Both, the advanced nature of the anti-problem gambling practice at HC and
the availability of serious evaluations of this practice, make HC ideally suited for
probing the interactions between problem gambling and risk management. All in all
S.F. Kingma2
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I will highlight a fundamental paradox of risk management which says that if we seek to
identify and counter the adverse consequences of commercial gambling, it becomes
also evident that a significant part of the problem cannot be addressed at all. This
paradox may reinforce illusions of control and may unjustly inform decisions to
further liberalize and expand the casino market.
In this article I first relate CSR to risk governance in the field of gambling. Sub-
sequently the research into self-exclusion and the casino company will be introduced.
After that I examine the addiction prevention policy and self-exclusion program of HC,
in particular the way research and management are connected. How does social
research on the key issue of problem gambling relate to casino management?
Finally, I discuss the findings and highlight the paradoxes between the production
and exploitation of gambling risks on the one hand and the mitigation and management
of these risks on the other.
2. Social responsibility and risk governance
CSR has always been closely associated with ‘beyond compliance’ policies, i.e. pol-
icies that go at least partially beyond direct economic and legal obligations (Carroll
1999). In his overview of the development of the concept of CSR Carroll (1999),
who defined CSR in terms of a firm that ‘should strive to make a profit, obey the
law, be ethical, and be a good corporate citizen’ (289), demonstrates that it is not
always clear what is included in this concept, and that there are narrow as well as
broad definitions which refer to business ethics and corporate citizenship. In the case
of the casino industry, CSR is often associated with a problem solving approach,
defined by Fitch (1976) ‘as the serious attempt to solve social problems caused
wholly or in part by the corporation’ (quoted in: Carroll 1999, 281). In this respect I
follow a minimum definition of CSR as proposed by Campbell (2006), whose
concern is, comparable to this article, with the substantive rather than the rhetorical
aspects of CSR. Campbell (2006, 928) mentions two aspects that comprise ‘. . . a
minimum behavior standard with respect to the corporation’s relationship to its stake-
holders below which corporate behavior becomes socially irresponsible’. Corporations
should first not knowingly do anything that could harm their stakeholders, in our case
the casino customers and ultimately the legitimacy of the state. Problem gambling
might easily undermine the legitimacy of the state in case it is seen as a consequence
of defective legislation and failing supervision, or as an instance of immorally profiting
from vulnerable citizens. If corporations do harm stakeholders, second, they should ‘. . .
rectify it whenever it is discovered and brought to their attention’ (Campbell 2006,
928). A self-exclusion program is an obvious and good example of such an attempt
at ‘rectification’. Crucial in Campbell’s definition are the notions of ‘knowingly’, ‘dis-
covered’ and ‘attention’. These notions all refer to the awareness and understanding of
the involved risks of, in our case, problem gambling. These notions also anticipate the
processes of meaning-making and knowledge creation involved in converting uncer-
tainties into manageable risks (Power 2007).
The actual meaning of CSR will depend upon the situation and is relative to societal
expectations and the managerial perception and understanding of these (Pater and
Lierop 2006). In his historical overview Carroll (1999, 292) notes from the early
1990s onwards a growing concern with the empirical grounding of CSR as well as
theoretical innovations such as stakeholder theory. These developments point toward
a need to deal with the socially constructed nature and social practice of CSR
Culture and Organization 3
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(Jackson and Apostolakou 2010). Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) draw specific atten-
tion to the institutional context and social impact of specific industrial sectors, of which
gambling may be a case in point. Legal gambling may even be regarded as an extreme
case in which both controversies and responsibilities are disproportionately articulated
and amplified.
The emergence of risk and responsibility as a governance issue in the field of gam-
bling is immediately related to the legalization and liberalization of gambling markets,
which in recent decades took place in many countries (Kingma 1997; Reith 2008; Cos-
grave 2010; Chambers 2011). In this process gambling is normalized as an entertain-
ment product on the consumer market. While gambling regulation in the context of
illegal markets is mainly concerned with restriction and criminalization, in the
context of legal gambling it becomes of increasing importance to distinguish sharply
between acceptable and unacceptable forms of gambling. Gambling can, at least in
some of its forms, be regarded as ‘edgework’, characterized by voluntary risk-taking
as an end in itself, similar to other kinds of risky leisure pursuits such as sky-diving,
mountaineering or drug taking (Lyng 2005; Cosgrave 2008). Paradoxically, gambling
in its commoditized shapes is marketed and presented as a ‘safe risk’, in which the risks
of gambling are largely (claimed to be) brought under control (Gephart 2001). In the
context of legal gambling distinctions have to be drawn between the consumption of
risk, which is regarded as legitimate to exploit, and risky consumption, which might
lead to addiction and other adverse consequences (Cosgrave 2009, 47). In this
respect it seems only logical that the liberalization of gambling markets is paralleled
by the medicalization of gambling and the emergence of problem gambling policies
(Castellani 2000).
In a way, the risk-society as theorized by Beck (1992) has a responsible society as its
logical counterpart. Beck originally conceived the risk society as resulting from
processes of ‘reflexive modernization’, which entails the self-confrontation of modernity
with the side-effects of modernization (Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994; Beck and Holzer
2007). To a certain extent ‘the problem of modernity has moved from solving externally
imposed problems to solving self-produced problems’ (Beck and Holzer 2007, 8).
Problem gambling can largely be regarded as a self-produced social problem, because
commercial gambling is based upon political and managerial decisions to liberalize
gambling, and because the consumption of gambling products involves a freedom of
choice. It is a reflexive attitude toward the side effects of commercial gambling which
makes gambling part of the risk-society (Kingma 2004). In Beck’s theory, ‘reflexivity’
refers to a reaction to the consequences of former decisions, in our case decisions regard-
ing the liberalization and exploitation of gambling, as well as to a ‘reflection’ in the sense
of awareness. Beck’s risk society perspective is highly relevant for the field of gambling,
since problem gambling involves a risk with a number of features that are typical for the
risk society: The risk society comprises rather new risks, which are based on human
decision-making; of which single causes are hard to identify; which are hard to calculate;
and of which the effects take a long time to emerge; and may potentially affect a wide
range of people (Lupton 1999; Beck and Holzer 2007). All these features apply to the
notion of ‘problem gambling’ (Rosecrance 1988; Castellani 2000; Smith, Hodgins,
and Williams 2007). Decisions which might have problem gambling as an unintended
consequence refer to the political and managerial decisions to provide gambling oppor-
tunities as well as to the choices of gambling consumers to gamble. With the origin of
such a risk in decision-making ‘the problem of accountability and responsibility irrevoc-
ably arises’ (Beck and Holzer 2007, 5). Because of this accountability, and the
S.F. Kingma4
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associated questions regarding blame, the risks of the risk society are often highly poli-
ticized. In this respect I would refer to the unresolved debate in the gambling sector on
the question whether the blame for problem gambling rests with the gambler or with the
gambling industry (Castellani 2000).
The integration of risks in gambling policies and the dynamics of risk management
take shape in the context of the development of a new regime of gambling regulation.
This regime figures around risk analyses rather than moral considerations and has been
coined in terms of the ‘risk model’ of gambling regulation (Kingma 2004, 2008a;
Chambers 2011). Typical features of this risk model are: (a) a liberal political consensus
on the legitimacy of gambling as commercial entertainment, (b) acknowledgment of the
economic importance of the gambling sector, and (c) control of gambling markets, pri-
marily to confront the risks of addiction and crime. The rise of the risk model can be
understood as part of a paradigm shift in regulation, and signals a new phase in the
overall commoditization of gambling, a change which claims pleasure as a primary
motive for gambling behavior and an expanding commercial gambling sector which
has a growing share in and influences on society at large. Organizationally this devel-
opment implies that casinos: (a) legitimately offer gambling opportunities in the shape
of entertainment products and services, (b) exploit gambling in order to make a finan-
cial profit and other economic benefits, and (c) develop responsible gambling strategies
in order to prevent and mitigate the side effects of gambling exploitation, including
reputational risks, related to excessive gambling.
In the risk-regime of regulation, self-regulation at the organizational level of gam-
bling operators is as important as state-regulation. It is here that the connection with
CSR can be made. The emergence of problem gambling has prompted political
concern about harms, producing forms of ‘sub-politics’ (Beck 1992, 183–187)
which are taking over the leading role of formal politics in dealing with problem gam-
bling. As argued by Beck: ‘Governmental monitoring agencies and a risk-sensitive
media publicity sphere begin to talk their way into and govern the “intimate sphere”
of plant management’ (186). A feature of gambling organizations’ management of
risks is the need to demonstrate that gambling-related social problems can be success-
fully controlled. This is one of the major assumptions of the risk model of regulation,
which in its pure form is grounded on cost-benefit analyses. Characteristic of the focus
on risk in gambling governance is further the construction of distinctions between so-
called normal or recreational gambling and abnormal, or excessive and problematic
gambling (Nicoll 2010).
Since CSR represents a way of dealing with the outcomes or (unintended) conse-
quences of managerial decisions and business activities, I will frame the CSR policies
of the focal organization HC in terms of a risk-governance approach (Renn 2008) in
combination with some basic notions of actor–network theory (ANT) (Callon 1986;
Latour 2005). Both are largely constructivist approaches which were developed in
the 1980s and subsequently evolved into overarching sociological perspectives.
Although these approaches have different backgrounds they are partly overlapping
and complementary. The risk approach can be regarded as particularly useful for
addressing the unintended consequences of organizational actions. ANT is particularly
suited for addressing the organization in relation to a seamless web of heterogeneous
stakeholders, which in the context of CSR can be broadly defined as ‘anyone liable
to be affected by organizational action’ (Maclagan 2008, 372).1 Risk governance and
ANT both consider the role of knowledge production and science as particularly con-
structive for contemporary social formations. With this I am not looking for essentialist
Culture and Organization 5
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codes for the CSR of casinos. Rather, I am interested in the monitoring and meaning-
making processes regarding gambling behaviors and self-exclusion programs. In this
respect I will focus on how contemporary gambling enterprises ‘problematize’ gam-
bling behavior, how new, risk management-related, actors are ‘interested’ in and
‘enrolled’ in gambling organizations, and how research has been ‘mobilized’ to
account for problem gambling and risk management strategies. These instances can
be regarded as successive moments in the ‘translation’ of actor networks (Callon 1986).
It is important, also for the field of gambling studies, to understand how gambling
organizations change in view of gambling risks, and the role organizations play in the
constitution and management of gambling risks. Gambling corporations do not simply
deal with problem gambling but in the process also transform themselves as well as the
gambling problems. In the risk-governance approach risks, or the possible conse-
quences of organizational decisions, are converted into organizing principles and
focal points in management processes (Hutter and Power 2005). In processes of risk
governance, risk ‘represents a specific way in which aspects of reality can be concep-
tualized and rendered controllable’ (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006, 45). Since there is
widespread recognition that gambling risks are endemic, the issue appears to have
become one of managing an acceptable level of risk, rather than the elimination of
risks. Dutch casinos developed their problem gambling policy as part of their overall
‘enterprise risk management’ (ERM). According to Power (2007) the rise of ERM rep-
resents a new phase of corporate governance. In this new phase internal control
becomes as important, and sometimes takes precedence over, external control and regu-
lations. Self-regulation and compliance to normative rules of organizational conduct
becomes the new standard to which external control agencies develop a complementary
role. Power (2007) regards the practice of risk description and risk communication as an
important part of ERM.
In the process of internalizing external threats organizations have to address three
basic questions (Renn 2008, 40). These questions concern the ‘(un)desirability’ of out-
comes, the ‘uncertainty’ of outcomes and the ‘conceptualization’ of risks and respon-
sibilities. The answers to these questions all depend upon cultural preferences and
social context (Renn 2008, 40). Risk governance thus goes beyond straightforward
risk assessments and risk-regulations. According to Renn (2008), ‘risk governance
looks at the complex web of actors, rules, conventions, processes and mechanisms con-
cerned with how relevant risk information is collected, analyzed and communicated,
and how management decisions are taken’ (9). In this respect it is relevant that respon-
sible gambling is primarily conceived as a process involving many stakeholders, such
as the consumers, operators, health services, community groups and government
agencies (Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, and Shaffer 2004, 303). The primary stakeholders
implied in the evaluation of self-exclusion programs will in this article be more nar-
rowly defined as the organizational actors of casino managers and employees, the cus-
tomers as the potential victims of gambling, and the researchers as the representatives of
science.
3. Casinos and responsible gambling
The concern over problem gambling, and the interest in risk management within gam-
bling enterprises, has led several casino companies to develop so-called ‘responsible
gambling policies’ (Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, and Nower 2007; Reith 2008; Thompson
2010; Smith and Rubenstein 2011). In the case of casinos, such programs often include
S.F. Kingma6
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a strategy of ‘self-exclusion’ to limit access to gambling opportunities for problem gam-
blers, which, in turn, aids in the elimination or reduction of harm experiences. Accord-
ing to Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, and Nower (2007) a self-exclusion program was first
formally constituted in Manitoba, Canada in 1989, and in 1996 the Missouri Gaming
Commission implemented the first such program in the USA. Currently, self-exclusion
programs operate in many casinos worldwide, although there are huge differences as to
the logic and design of these programs dependent upon the institutional context of
specific gambling jurisdictions (Thompson 2010). Thompson (2010) distinguishes
between exclusion bans which are strictly voluntary, such as advocated in North
America, and mandatory bans, such as often used against cheaters and professional
‘card counters’, and which are sometimes also used against compulsive gamblers, for
instance, in South Korea and Switzerland. In between voluntary and mandatory bans
Thompson envisions a ‘third way’ of banning for a list of ‘unwelcome’ gamblers
who might be actively discouraged from casino play by depriving them from direct
advertising, complimentaries, credit play, or the collection of big prizes.
Although not mentioned as such by Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, and Nower (2007)
and Thompson (2010), the Dutch casino corporation HC should be regarded as one
of the first and most advanced casino companies in the area of responsible gambling
and self-exclusion programs (Nowatzki and Williams 2002). This self-exclusion
program has also been seriously evaluated (Bruin de et al. 2001), a report which will
be referred to more extensively further on.
From a governance perspective self-exclusion strategies are typical ‘technologies of
agency’ (Dean 1999, 147), which engage us as active and free consumers, and as
‘agents capable of taking control of our own risk’. Discourses of responsibility
address the individual consumer who is made responsible for his or her own
decision-making in the marketplace (Reith 2008, 150). As Reith notes, this decision-
making implies not only a freedom of choice, but also the idea of ‘informed choice’:
‘The hope here is that informed choice will result in rational, and therefore responsible,
behaviour . . .’ (152). Because of this, responsible gambling strategies usually start with
providing information and education. Individual choice and proper information are also
the keystones of the so-called ‘Reno Model’, one of the first comprehensive frame-
works for responsible gambling strategies (Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, and Shaffer
2004, 311). In the Reno model an institution’s ‘duty of care’ forms the flip side of
the freedom of choice coin. Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, and Shaffer (2004, 311) empha-
size that the extent and nature of this responsibility is ‘complex and uncertain’ in part
because the limits and extent of the duty of care are not legally defined. Smith and
Rubenstein (2011, 56) also conclude that the ‘responsibilities of the gambler, the gam-
bling provider, the machine manufacturer, the regulator, and others are still unclear’.
This means that responsibility objectives and practices have to be developed by the
gambling corporation itself in interaction with important stakeholders such as regulat-
ory bodies and treatment agencies.
By definition, self-exclusion offers a clear case of self-regulation in the field of gam-
bling. What is minimally required from a responsibility perspective, and this is consist-
ent with the ‘minimum standard’ which I in the theoretical section adopted from
Campbell (2006), is that the gambling industry ‘must not knowingly exploit or take
advantage of any player, in particular, vulnerable individuals manifesting character-
istics associated with gambling-related problems’ (Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, and
Shaffer 2004, 312). At the other extreme of the responsibility spectrum one should
recognize that the gambling industry ‘does not have the expertise or responsibility to
Culture and Organization 7
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diagnose or clinically treat individuals with gambling-related harms’ (Blaszczynski,
Ladouceur, and Shaffer 2004, 312). For this purpose, responsible gambling organiz-
ations usually provide information about treatment services. Self-exclusion contracts
can be located somewhere in between these extremes. In such a contract the gambler
voluntarily agrees with the casino to be banned from the premises for a fixed or inde-
finite period (Nowatzki and Williams 2002; Napolitano 2003). The Reno model of
responsible gambling specifically calls for the empirical grounding of responsible gam-
bling policies since ‘regulatory responses often have been applied in the absence of any
evidence that demonstrates or supports the likelihood of effectiveness . . .’
(Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, and Shaffer 2004, 304). Measuring the effectiveness of
self-exclusion programs can be regarded as crucial for CSR since it gives a clear indi-
cation of the responsiveness of gambling companies to the issue of problem gambling
(Nowatzki and Williams 2002). Although often called for, serious and conclusive
evaluations of self-exclusion programs are remarkably scarce.
In the literature regarding self-exclusion programs, and the development of empiri-
cal evaluation research, three successive levels of reflection and the monitoring of gam-
bling risks can be discerned. A first concern is with the rationalization and normative
outline of self-exclusion programs, such as in the aforementioned ‘Reno model’.
This literature offers descriptions, gives legitimations and legal considerations but
does not teach much about the actual practice, let alone the effectiveness, of self-
exclusion programs. This level of CSR compares to the rhetoric and explicit statement
of good intentions but usually does not go beyond ‘lip-service’.
A second concern is with the registration of self-exclusion procedures in the evalu-
ation of responsibility programs. A fine example of this would be the evaluation of Aus-
tralian self-exclusion programs (The South Australian Centre for Economic Studies
2003). Other examples of this type of research include the first evaluation of the respon-
sibility practice of the Dutch casino corporation HC in 1998,2 and the evaluation of the
responsibility policy of the US-based transnational casino corporation Harrah’s
(Ladouceur and Ferland 2007). This second type of evaluation research is based on
input measurement and provides figures about the motivation, application and actual
practice of self-exclusion programs. This type of research, however, still hardly
teaches anything about the effectiveness of responsibility programs because it lacks
output measurement. The extensive Australian evaluation report explicitly concluded
that:
Overall, the limited data available on self-exclusion is input not outcomes based; it is
not possible to meaningfully comment on compliance by venues, rates of detection
or notification rates and hence the effectiveness of exclusion as a protective measure.
The reporting of breaches of self-excluded persons is inconsistent and infrequent.
There is no systematic procedure followed by venues in regard to reporting and the
industry has failed to implement such a system. (The SA Centre for Economic
Studies 2003, vi)
In addition, this Australian study concluded that a lack of a reliable system of identi-
fication, detection and enforcement seriously hinders the acceptance of self-exclusion
programs by the gambling industry. Thompson (2010, 360) also remarks that the
‘open door policies’ of North American casinos makes it very difficult to enforce
bans. In this respect the Dutch casinos have a great governance advantage in view of
CSR since in the Netherlands it is required by law that, in order to counter underaged
S.F. Kingma8
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gambling, every casino visitor has to be identified and registered upon entry. In any
case, the level of CSR represented by the second type of research compares to an expli-
cit account of the responsibility actions which have been taken.
A third concern is with the measurement of the outcomes and the effectiveness of
self-exclusion programs. This type of research is extremely scarce but the Dutch evalu-
ation research of 2000 provides an unprecedented and unique example (Bruin de et al.
2001). Unfortunately, this research has never been published officially and has only
been made available in the shape of a Dutch research report. Internationally, it has
only briefly been mentioned by Nowatzki and Williams (2002). The few other attempts
at output measurement restrict themselves to the self-excluders, and focus on the satis-
faction, usefulness and relapse of self-excluded gamblers (Ladouceur, Sylvain, and
Gosselin 2007; Tremblay, Boutin, and Ladouceur 2008). However, by merely
looking at self-excluders one fails to establish the effectiveness of self-exclusions
because it remains unknown how many of the problem gamblers actually do or do
not take part in self-exclusion programs. It is crucial to know whether the self-exclu-
sions address a small or a large part of the problem gamblers. After all, the overall
objective of responsible gambling programs is to decrease the prevalence of problem
gambling, therefore evaluations should give some indication of the effect self-exclusion
programs have on the prevalence of problem gambling. The research by Bruin de et al.
(2001) explicitly included this overall evaluation criterion. This research evaluated a
range of measures regarding problem gambling and explicitly recognized the impor-
tance of output measurement which was considered necessary to substantiate claims
about the effectiveness of responsibility measures. The research particularly aimed to
evaluate the utilization rate of the self-exclusion program among problem gamblers,
as well as the compliance with self-exclusion agreements, and the impact of exclusions
on the overall gambling behavior of self-excluders.
Because the research by Bruin de et al. (2001) was never published officially, and
the report is only available in Dutch, I will provide here the major methodological par-
ameters. This research was based upon extensive interviews with eight casino managers
and two responsible gambling consultants, a random survey among 1000 casino custo-
mers, in-depth interviews with 40 problem gamblers, and the analysis of approximately
7000 files of customers who got a self-exclusion or self-restriction in the period 1998–
2000. The survey was conducted in the year 2000 in 7 of the total of at that time 12 HC
establishments. The response of about 58% of the guests that upon entry of the casino
were asked to take part in the survey was regarded as quite reasonable (Bruin de et al.
2001, 17–20). It is primarily this unique report which I will refer to in order to ground
the responsibility practice of HC.
At HC the responsible gambling program was largely developed top-down in close
interaction with personnel. The program involved an attitude change because a signifi-
cant part of the workforce initially regarded responsible gambling as contradictory or
even hypocritical. An external consultancy agency was hired which from the early
1990s onwards provided regular training sessions for the entire work force in which
information about problem gambling was shared and practical advice for detecting
and dealing with problem gamblers was given. The active approach toward responsible
gambling is evident from the sharing of responsibility for problem gambling among the
entire workforce, the formulation and electronic registration of a strict business process
flow regarding self-exclusions, and the confrontation by casino officials of casino cus-
tomers which have been signaled with suspicious behavior that might point to gambling
problems. A significant nuance in the self-exclusion policy of HC was the provision,
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already introduced in 1989, that customers could opt for a less rigorous ‘self-restriction’
regarding the number of visits of, for instance, eight visits per month. Taken together,
self-exclusions and self-restrictions are at HC referred to as ‘protective measures’. In
this article I will regard self-restrictions as part of the self-exclusion program.
It has been estimated that between 1990 and 2000 about a total of 25,000 protec-
tive measures (individual customer exclusions or restrictions) had been taken (Bruin
de et al. 2001). Between 1985 and 2000 HC expanded from 3 to 12 urban casino
establishments, and over this period the gross profit of the company grew from 142
million to 1.1 billion guilders per year (Kingma 2008b). Since 2000 the Dutch
casino monopoly entered a consolidation phase in which responsible gambling pol-
icies were refined but never again scientifically evaluated. Major concerns of the con-
solidation phase were with efficiency, standardization and business continuity, and
with enhancing the entertainment profile and servicing as well as sharpening the
responsible gambling policies. The major management processes were all redefined
into a ‘risk-management’ framework, which not only includes responsible gambling
but also the economic returns (which were decreasing between 2007 and 2010),
market competition, crime and fraud, compliance, ICT controls and reputation risks.
In this way HC’s casino management has been turned into a kind of ERM, of
which responsible gambling is an integral part. The overall management objective
of ERM at HC is to ‘diminish the risk for errors, for taking wrong decision and
being surprised by unexpected circumstances as much as possible’ (Holland-Casino
2010, 17). In 2009 the number of self-exclusions and self-restrictions totaled 4300
and 4900, respectively, out of a total of 1.233 million individual customers that
visited a HC establishment.
Since 2008 the number of protective measures figures fairly constantly around 4
per 1000 visitors annually (Intraval 2011, 84). Although since 2000 HC’s responsible
gambling program has not been subjected again to specific scientific evaluations, HC
has in 2005 and 2011 been subject to general nationwide prevalence studies on
problem gambling. The 2011 research even devoted special attention to HC but expli-
citly cautioned that this did not include the measurement of policy effects (Intraval
2011, 81). The problem with nationwide prevalence studies is that they do not
provide statistically significant information about problem gambling on the organiz-
ational scale level of corporations such as HC. In 2010 the Dutch Court of Audits,
as mentioned in the introduction, indeed evaluated HC’s responsible gambling
policy positively (Algemene-Rekenkamer 2011); however, this evaluation was
solely based on information provided by HC about the corporations’ problem gam-
bling measures, such as the number of self-exclusions, and did not include any refer-
ence to the effectiveness of the responsible gambling program. This one-sided positive
focus on HC’s problem gambling measures, and the virtual lack of attention for effec-
tiveness, also characterizes the risk-communications concerning HC, including corpor-
ate communications, official policy reports and media accounts. Consistent with
Power’s et al. (2009, 310) analysis of ‘reputational risk’ as a relatively new logic of
organizing, in the case of casinos and responsible gambling, the ‘first-order’ risk of
problem gambling and the ‘second-order’ risk of reputation have become intertwined,
to the extent that it has become virtually impossible to distinguish between a self-
exclusion program as a means for tackling problem gambling or as a means for mana-
ging a casino’s legitimacy and reputation. This distinction has rather become an
empirical question and depends upon the responsiveness of casinos to the responsibil-
ity issue of problem gambling.
S.F. Kingma10
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [V
rije
 U
niv
ers
ite
it A
ms
ter
da
m]
 at
 06
:11
 21
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
15
 
4. The logic and practice of self-exclusion
4.1 An active approach
Responsible gambling and the practice of self-exclusion represent a truly new dimen-
sion in late modern casino management. As indicated above, at HC the responsible
gambling policies were introduced around 1990 and seriously improved in the
course of 1990s, regarding both personnel training and problem gambler registration.
Before that time, employees were not always convinced of the necessity of such pol-
icies. In the early days of responsible gambling a manager ‘security and risk control’
(SRC) witnessed a clear controversy over responsible gambling between the employees
servicing the guests and the security personnel that had to execute the self-exclusion
program:
They thought: the security department is going to talk our guests out of the casino . . . they
will light-heartedly impose self-restrictions and self-exclusions, therefore our returns will
decrease . . . We hardly knew how to deal with that controversy; we felt under great
pressure . . . There was serious resistance by these people and it was very hard to initiate
it [the self-exclusion program] (manager SRC; Bruin de et al. 2001, 29 [translation by the
author])
There were also significant differences in the responsiveness between the various
casino establishments to the responsible gambling policies. And the interviewed HC
managers offered varying rationales for responsible gambling policies. Some empha-
sized the long-term economic interests of the company or feared possible damage of
its public image because of problem gambling. However, compared to the initial
period, in 2000 there appeared to be a companywide commitment to responsible gam-
bling and the self-exclusion practice. According to the SRC officer cited above:
I believe that the way things are going now, we have found a good balance between the
protection of customers on the one hand and gambling returns on the other. As an organ-
ization you have a choice, either you do it or you don’t. And if you do it, you have to do it
well . . . There is no fighting any more over [problem gambling] policy or not. That’s clear
now. (Manager Security & Risk Control; cited in Bruin de et al. 2001, 104 [translation by
the author]).
In official statements the company communicates this overall idea of a ‘good
balance between optimal returns and social responsibility’ (Holland-Casino 2010, 5).
However, it is not clear what a ‘good balance’ means and by what standards it is
judged. As indicated in the previous section, in order to be able to assess this
balance evaluations should include output measurement. The research by Bruin de
et al. (2001) provides several measurements regarding the effectiveness of the HC
self-exclusion program.
A first level of responsiveness concerns the familiarity with the responsible gam-
bling program among casino customers. Knowledge and awareness can be regarded
as a pre-condition for the operation of any responsible gambling program. In 2000
about 75% of the customers was aware of the self-exclusion option and 40% had
taken notice of HC’s responsible gambling brochure The risks of the game. Although
this familiarity was regarded as reasonable, the research advised, and HC aimed to
improve, the familiarity rate among regular casino customers as well as customers
with signs of problem gambling (Bruin de et al. 2001, 129). However, whether this
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familiarity has actually increased can be doubted. In 2011 a national gambling survey
of which the sample included 300 HC visitors found that over half of them did not agree
with the statement that ‘problem gambling brochures at HC are visible enough’ (Intra-
val 2011, 84).
A second level of responsiveness concerns the detection and confrontation of casino
customers which carry signs of problem gambling. This is a crucial part of the respon-
sibility program. The intervention program starts with ‘signals’ given by casino employ-
ees, by gamblers or their relatives, or by the customer registration system that keeps
track of the frequency of individual casino visits. The intervention can be intrusive:
If we get a signal, we first check the guest: how often does he come? What does he play?
Do we have a record in our database on him? Does he come more often than eight times a
month? . . . If he could be a PG [Problem Gambler] we give him an observation. This
means that we watch what he is doing. Following somebody with the cameras is pretty
easy. If we think something’s wrong we invite him for a personal conversation. This is
done by our division. (Manager Security & Risk Control, cited in Bruin de et al. 2001,
65 [translation by the author]).
Since 1997, when a systematic companywide registration with an electronic data-
base for ‘gaming control’ came into effect, the number of reported signals increased sig-
nificantly from less than 400 to about 1300 annually in 2000 (Bruin de et al. 2001, 62).
The number of ‘Problem Gambling Conversations’ (PGC’s), i.e. a talk with an individ-
ual gambler about his or her gambling behavior, either on request of the customer or the
casino, increased as well. Between 1994 and 2000 the number of these talks more than
doubled from about 3000 to about 7000 annually (Bruin de et al. 2001, 66). Roughly
55% of these talks were on initiative of the casino. The most likely reason for a success-
ful confrontation by the casino had to do with a significant increase in the gambler’s
frequency of play or with desperate behavior during or after a gambling session.
However, the in-depth interviews with the 40 problem gamblers revealed that most
of them had never been confronted by the casino, while they had the idea that they
must have sent out signals that casino personnel could or should have noticed as
signs of problem gambling (Bruin de et al. 2001, 70).
Especially the confrontation of customers with their gambling behavior by casino
personnel is a highly sensitive matter because this might come unexpected and may
be experienced as intrusive, embarrassing or even insulting. For a number of potential
problem gamblers the confrontation actually worked. About 60% of the customers who
were ever confronted by the casino judged this intervention as overall positive (Bruin
de et al. 2001, 61). As one of these customers recalls:
I think that it was plain to see that I was in bad shape, but they could have seen this much
earlier . . . I was desperate, playing with a lot of money on more than one table. And I was
sweating. Then a floor man came to me and asked how I was doing. We agreed that it was
better for me to ask for a self-exclusion, which I did . . . (Problem gambler, 51 year old
male; cited in Bruin de et al. 2001, 69 [translation by the author]).
However, other potential problem gamblers were surprised or annoyed by this inter-
ference. About 20% were plainly negative. A comment in this direction:
At a certain moment I came at the desk where you have to register, and the woman said
‘wait a moment; somebody is coming to see you’. I didn’t get it . . . And guess what, the
S.F. Kingma12
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [V
rije
 U
niv
ers
ite
it A
ms
ter
da
m]
 at
 06
:11
 21
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
15
 
casino thought that I was visiting too often! . . . What bothered me was that they wanted
me to take a self-restriction, and that I couldn’t do much about it. (Problem gambler,
36-year-old female; cited in Bruin de et al. 2001, 68 [translation by the author]).
About half of the customers that were ever confronted by the casino even claimed
that they never had experienced any gambling problem. These findings indicate that the
PGCs point at a considerable number of false-positives (those incorrectly suspected of
problem gambling) as well as false-negatives (the unaddressed problem gamblers).
For individual gamblers, interventions by the casino may constitute significant
moments in the development of their gambling problem. However, this ambiguity
and unpredictability in responses toward confrontations by casino employees also high-
lights a fundamental paradox regarding the principle of self-exclusion. Since self-
exclusion is by definition regarded as a voluntary act, any urge on behalf of the
casino is at odds with it. At the same time problem gamblers are by definition less
capable than ordinary customers of taking control and responsibility for their own con-
sumer choices and gambling. As Reith remarks: . . . ‘it is precisely a lack of power that
characterizes those who have lost control of their gambling behavior. For problem gam-
blers themselves, and those with a predisposing vulnerability to the development of
such problems, responsibility is not a particularly helpful concept’ (Reith 2008, 153).
This freedom paradox at the same time legitimates and limits interventions by the
casino as it accounts for a number of significant weaknesses of self-exclusion programs.
Some problem gamblers simply are not likely to be patronized by casino officials while
others seem to deny and hide their problems. Those who agree on self-exclusive
measures sometimes evade these measures by gambling abroad, on the Internet or in
amusement arcades. Further, not all customers that request self-exclusions are actual
problem gamblers. Some self-exclude just because they fear excessive gambling and
seek to prevent this from actually happening.
Nevertheless, as already mentioned in the previous section, a significant number of
casino customers does take protective measures. In 1999, the HC database showed
4200 ‘protective measures’, including 2400 self-exclusions and 1800 self-restrictions
(Bruin de et al. 2001, 84). About half of these protective measures concerned measures
for the duration of one year; a quarter concerned duration of half a year, and the remain-
ing part concerned exclusion for an indefinite time period. Of the customers who took a
self-restriction most (80%) restricted their visits to a maximum of 4 per month. The
survey also included a number of respondents (7%) which at any point in their gam-
bling career had taken protective measures; corrected for frequency of play this
would mean that the survey indicated that about 2% of the HC visitors had ever
taken a protective measure.
All these figures and considerations clearly indicate that around 2000 HC had devel-
oped an active responsible gambling and self-exclusion program. However, this infor-
mation hardly gives an idea about the effectiveness of this program. For that purpose we
need to know more about the utilization of the self-exclusion option among problem
gamblers.
4.2 The utilization of self-exclusions
To learn more about the utilization of protective measures we first have to know more
about the actual number of problem gamblers that frequent HC establishments, other-
wise it would be impossible to know which part of them actually comes in contact with
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the casino about their gambling problems. In the evaluation research the prevalence of
problem gambling among casino customers was measured with the so-called ‘South
Oaks Gambling Screen’ (SOGS) (Bruin de et al. 2001, 22). The SOGS is a straightfor-
ward and internationally widely used screener for gambling problems designed by
Lesieur and Blume (1987) on the basis of the DSM-III (Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of mental disorders) criteria for pathological gambling (Smith, Hodgins, and
Williams 2007). Pathological gambling – more or less synonymously used for ‘com-
pulsive gambler’, ‘problem gambler’, ‘excessive gambler’ and ‘gambling addict’ – was
included in the DSM in 1984, indicating that pathological gambling constitutes a com-
paratively new ‘disorder of impulse control’ with growing significance. The SOGS
basically scores an individual on a list of 20 problematic gambling items, such as gam-
bling more than intended, feelings of guilt, arguments, and the borrowing of money in
relation to gambling. This screener regards those with a positive score on five or more
of such items as ‘probable pathological gamblers’. As applied in the survey at HC the
SOGS indicated a prevalence of about 6% problem gamblers among the respondents of
the survey (N ¼ 972) (Bruin de et al. 2001, 43). Corrected for the main gambling outlet
of the respondent (HC or otherwise) and the frequency of play, this percentage was
redressed to 2.2% problem gamblers in the survey sample. Based on their judgment
of overestimation attributed to the SOGS the researchers further adapted this figure
to 1.3%, which at that time would lead to an estimate of about 24,000 problem gamblers
among HC customers.
It is interesting to note the ways in which the SOGS almost instantaneously turns a
hard to detect controversial syndrome into a scientific fact represented by a straightfor-
ward percentage. It is even more interesting to note that casino managers, regulators,
journalists and politicians take this scientific fact as a matter-of-fact. Similar to previous
and other prevalence studies of problem gambling in the Netherlands, the 1.3% of
problem gamblers at HC was undisputed in any kind of risk communication outside
of the academic world. Apparently, de facto, this means that this percentage was
widely regarded as an acceptable level of problem gambling at HC. This again is
highly significant from a risk-governance perspective because, as indicated in the theor-
etical section, from a governance perspective there is no such thing as an ‘objective
risk’. Although there usually is a realist basis for uncertainties, risks, and the social,
managerial and political assessments of risks, result from the perception and socio-
cultural valuation of uncertainties (Beck and Holzer 2007; Power 2007; Renn 2008).
In this sense the objectification of problem gambling and the 1.3% should be considered
as the outcome of a specific measurement practice, and the matter-of-fact acceptance of
this figure should be considered as the reflection of a specific risk concept. In order to
understand the specificity of this risk concept we need to know more about the measure-
ment practice of problem gambling.
Scientifically, the validity and reliability of the SOGS are not undisputed. As many
studies have indicated there is a range of problems with the SOGS (Stinchfields 2002;
Orford 2003; McMillen 2007). Although the evaluation study of HC’s responsible
gambling practice did make a correction for the likely overestimation of problem gam-
blers by the SOGS, this report did not discuss further critique on the SOGS and
regarded this instrument overall as a ‘psychometric reliable’ screener (Bruin de et al.
2001, 42). However, from a risk governance perspective the SOGS can be criticized
for its positivist epistemology in that it assumes a one-on-one relationship between a
social phenomenon and its representation in scientific figures. In this respect the
SOGS has its roots in the medical approach to gambling addiction.
S.F. Kingma14
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The medical approach is largely derived from studies of gamblers and addicts in
clinical settings and focuses on the bad consequences of gambling behavior (Dickerson
1984; Lesieur 1984; Lesieur and Custer 1984; Meyer and Bachman 1993). However,
there has been a serious controversy over the pathological or disease model versus
the problem gambling model of excessive gambling (Castellani 2000). Where the
disease model, as advocated by, for instance, Gamblers Anonymous, recommends
abstinence, and accentuates the responsibilities of the industry, the problem gambling
approach emphasizes the feasibility of controlled gambling and accentuates the respon-
sibilities of the gambler for correcting his or her own excessive behavior. In this respect
the problem gambling approach follows the logic of the sub-cultural perspective on
gambling addiction, which contrasts with the medical approach (Kingma 1997). The
sub-cultural approach is largely derived from studies of gamblers and addicts in
natural, everyday circumstances, and focuses less on the consequences and more on
the cultural meanings of gambling (Goffman 1972 [1967]; Livingston 1974; Herman
1976; Oldman 1978). Addiction is from this understanding regarded as a label that,
in principle, can be put on all games and gamblers. This perspective relativizes gam-
bling addiction and is consistent with a cultural relativist perspective on risk in
western culture such as outlined by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982).
However, any controversy over the meaning of problem gambling remains hidden
behind the objectifying classificatory method of the SOGS. The SOGS turns the ambig-
uous, subjective and largely invisible phenomenon of gambling addiction into straight-
forward and calculable, and therefore seemingly controllable, ‘scientific risks’. In this
way the SOGS epitomizes as much an act of ‘fact finding’ as an act of ‘fact making’ in
the sense of Latour’s (1987) ‘science in action’ studies. In a way the SOGS draws a
sharp line between, and therefore introduces a normative standard for, acceptable
and unacceptable gambling. It may very well be that the objective and quantitative
aspect of the SOGS especially appeals to casino managers and regulators because it
suggests opportunities for control. With this managers implicitly adopt a rational
choice concept of risk. Renn (2008, 24–27) distinguishes this rational choice
concept on the one side from a critical concept of risk because it does not relate
risks to broader social structures. On the other side Renn distinguishes the rational
choice concept from a risk society and cultural concept of risk because it assumes a
realist and not a constructivist basis for risk. In the rational choice concept of risk:
actions are reduced to individual choices; means and ends are clearly separated;
people optimize individual utility, have stable preferences, and have knowledge
about the potential outcomes of their actions. In the rational choice concept the under-
standing of the seriousness of a risk is ‘modified by personal preferences or values of
organizational culture’ (Renn 2008, 27). This rational concept of risk is implicit in
scientific accounts of self-exclusion such as expressed by Blaszczynski, Ladouceur,
and Nower (2007), as discussed in a previous section. However, with the rational
concept of risk casino managers may in their quest for control very well end up with
an illusion of control to the extent that the SOGS gives them the false suggestion
that a real risk has been captured which can be brought under rational control.
Irrespective of this further paradox of risk management, which might be called the
objectivity paradox the report by Bruin de et al. (2001) indisputably indicated that as
much as 60% of the customers who in the survey were objectively classified as potential
problem gamblers, were never confronted with their behavior by HC employees. For
this reason the evaluation report concluded that the scope of HC’s prevention policy
was rather limited (Bruin de et al. 2001, 130). The researchers concluded that although
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the detecting capacity for problem gamblers among HC employees might be enhanced,
there probably would remain a significant fraction of potential problem gamblers that is
unlikely to be confronted by the casino. With this the evaluation research made mani-
fest that the described ‘technologies of agency’ not only point to a reflexive monitoring
of risks, but also point toward a major paradox of risk management. For, with an
increasing precision in identifying problem gamblers and for facilitating self-exclu-
sions, it becomes, as a corollary, equally clear that there is a certain bandwidth of pro-
blems that is reasonably beyond control and has to be accepted. In addition to the
apparent acceptability of the ‘scientific fact’ that at HC 1.3% of the customers are
problem gamblers, it also appears to be acceptable that a considerable part of the
problem cannot be identified at all. In other words, in responsibilized gambling organ-
izations such as HC we witness together with a growing risk-awareness a growing
awareness of the ‘limitations of expertise’. This means that ‘no expert system can be
wholly expert in terms of the consequences of the adoption of expert principles’
(Giddens 1990, 125). Learning from this knowledge paradox that a problem is hard
and partly impossible to identify and control may be an unintended and unwelcome
side effect of the efforts put into responsible gambling policies.
5. Discussion
In this article I have examined the CSR of HC, the operator of the Dutch casino mon-
opoly. CSR in the case of casinos is part of the broader move toward ‘responsible gam-
bling’ in the gambling industry. I theoretically framed CSR in the casino business into a
risk-governance and stakeholder perspective (Renn 2008). Casinos typically fall in the
category of organizations ‘that are both centers for processing and handling risks and
potential producers and exporters of risk’ (Hutter and Power 2005, 1). I have basically
argued that the growth of HC is part of the expansion of legal gambling interests which
has created an ‘institutionalized risk environment’ (Giddens 1990, 124, 128), where the
risky activities of gambling have produced new forms of consumption and problems
which also require the production of knowledge for the management of the activity.
It seems only logical that a focus on the side-effects of organizational production pro-
cesses irrevocably enhance the responsibility for these side-effects. The risk-society as
defined by Beck (1992) therefore has a responsible society as its logical counterpart.
The risks that legal gambling organizations such as HC face not only revolve around
the need to ensure consumer safety – i.e. to prevent the ‘primary risk’ of ‘problem’ –
and ‘pathological’ gambling from occurring but also involve the ‘secondary risk’ of
‘reputational risk’ (Power et al. 2009). Regarding CSR, I have drawn special attention
to the actual responsiveness, and therefore the knowledge creation and empirical
grounding, of HC’s responsible gambling policy and self-exclusion program. This is
particularly important in order to be able to distinguish between responsible gambling
policies which are primarily informed by gambling problems or rather informed by
reputational concerns and other legitimacy problems. In this discussion, I would like
to draw attention to three major issues.
First, CSR is not a self-evident feature of casino organizations. In the early phases of
development, such organizations, as was HC, are usually preoccupied with legal
responsibilities and with fighting fraud and crime (Kingma 2008b). When HC’s top-
management in the early 1990s introduced active responsible gambling policies this
was a controversial issue which was experienced as contradictory by many employees.
The ‘problematization’ of the social responsibility for problem gambling clearly
S.F. Kingma16
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required a learning experience and an attitude change. That HC was worldwide among
the first casino corporations to take responsible gambling seriously can partly be attrib-
uted to the monopoly situation and the close involvement of the state. However, respon-
sible gambling can more generally be understood as a logical counterpart to the
liberalization of gambling markets which require the normalization of gambling as
an entertainment activity and thus a push back of unacceptable forms of excessive gam-
bling. In the context of legal gambling an increasingly sharp line has to be drawn
between normal and abnormal, i.e. excessive and problematical gambling behavior
(Nicoll 2010). However, the acknowledgment of problem gambling and the organiz-
ation of self-exclusion programs creates a freedom paradox, because the basic idea
of freedom of choice and voluntariness is at odds with interference by the company
(Reith 2008). This freedom paradox accounts for several weaknesses of the self-exclu-
sion program in which the ultimate decision resides with the customer, who can always
deny problems, deceive employees, ignore advice and work around agreements. As
demonstrated in the case of HC, responsible gambling is aimed at the individual
who is, in the last instance, enjoined to manage his own gambling risks. Blaszczynski,
Ladouceur, and Nower (2007, 67) even suggest that self-exclusion programs should be
more focused on ‘enhancing the internal controls of the individual to assist them in
regaining control over gambling behaviour’. Thus, self-exclusion programs are effec-
tive in redistributing risks from the state and the gambling industry to individual
consumers.
Second, the organization of a responsible gambling policy and a self-exclusion
program did not so much end the ignorance about and exploitation of excessive gam-
blers but the beginning of a transitional phase in which the casino corporation devel-
oped standards and procedures, managed by the division ‘SRC’, for detecting and
dealing with problem gamblers. The development of this self-exclusion practice
involved a differentiated network of organizational actors who gradually ‘enrolled’
in the program, notably the HC managers, IT specialists, trainers and consultants,
the servicing employees, and the researchers for evaluating the program. They all
had to make sense of the confusing notion of problem gambling and of their new
responsibilities. In these processes the various actors related their understanding of
problem gambling to their specific organizational practice, i.e. their position, tasks
and identity within the company. In these processes, organizational practices were
modified and new practices emerged. In terms of ANT (Callon 1986; Latour 1987,
2005), the diffusion of the responsible gambling practice went together with the ‘trans-
lation’ of problem gambling into the terms of the various organizational actors
involved. The consultants and trainers, for instance, redefined gambling harms in
the psychological terms of ‘problem gambling’ and operationalized this abstract
concept for practical purposes. The HC managers designed a business process flow
chart for the detection and registration of problem gamblers and allocated various
tasks and responsibilities throughout the organization. Finally, the researchers
offered reflexive feedback about all these actions with their measurements and evalu-
ation of the self-exclusion program. The researchers even produced an objective figure
for the extent of the problem, namely 1.3% problem gamblers among the customers of
HC. Apparently, this figure was widely regarded as acceptable. However, the absence
in HC’s responsible gambling program, and in the Dutch gambling policies, of a clear
and explicit governance goal regarding the acceptable standard of problem gambling,
in itself indicates that these policies do not fully comply with the ideal model of risk
governance. Risk-based approaches ideally express how far governance should
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intervene to manage, rather than eliminate, adverse outcomes (Hood, Rothstein, and
Baldwin 2001).
In my examination I have drawn special attention to the ‘mobilization’ of research
and knowledge in the development of responsible gambling policies because these pol-
icies can hardly be conceived without the scientific identification and evaluation of
risks. With the conceptualization and measurement of problem gambling researchers
bring this adverse consequence of the exploitation of gambling inside the management
realm of casinos. In this sense problem gambling should not be regarded as a mere unin-
tended consequence but as an adverse consequence that is now incorporated in the late
modern organization of gambling. With the analysis of these processes a light can be
shed on how precisely responsibility is interwoven with the entire corporation.
I have emphasized in particular the ‘objectivity paradox’ which is created by the ration-
alization and researching of gambling risks; a paradox which easily leads to illusions of
control by casino managers and regulators.
Third, the organization of a responsible gambling policy and self-exclusion practice
at HC involved the design of new distinctions and interactions between management
and casino employees on the one hand and the casino customers and other stakeholders
on the other. With this, new norms were instituted in the corporation. The responsible
gambling policy and self-exclusion program at HC produced a sharper distinction
between regular customers and problem gamblers. The attentiveness of casino employ-
ees to problem gamblers, the problem gambling conversations, the customer regis-
trations in the database, the self-exclusion agreements and the evaluations, all
constitute a new matrix of protective measures for casino customers and, to the
extent that this care is communicated to external stakeholders, creates a new image
of the casino company. As a whole this company is redefined into a responsibilized
gambling corporation. In a way HC has been redesigned around a new norm in the gam-
bling practice, demarcating the pleasurable gambling experience from the problemati-
cal one. This redesign affects the entire organizational culture as it involves deep-rooted
assumptions – embodied in the self-exclusion practice, the measurement instruments
and the evaluation standards – concerning the individualization of risks and responsi-
bilities, a rational choice conception of gambling risks, and a technocratic approach of
risk management. It is in this respect significant to point out that HC’s responsible gam-
bling policy is embedded in a more encompassing framework of ERM in which respon-
sible gambling is linked to the management of reputational risk as understood by Power
(2007). As argued by Power this concern for reputational risk is particularly relevant for
companies that operate in a highly evaluative institutional environment, a circumstance
that certainly applies to HC; a corporation which almost continuously has to account for
its policies, not only to the media but also to the Dutch gambling committee, to the min-
istries of economic affairs and justice, and to Parliament.
It is important to point out that responsible gambling should be understood in
relation to irresponsible gambling and always remains a matter of degree. Instead of
speaking of responsible companies I, therefore, prefer to speak of a gradual process
of ‘responsibilization’ and responsibilizing companies. A responsibilized casino
company addresses problem gambling but does not necessarily have to be effective
with this. Regarding this crucial point I have emphasized the ‘knowledge paradox’
of risk management, as substantiated by the evaluation of the effectiveness of HC’s
responsibility program. While the evaluation made clear that those who took part in
the self-exclusion program were over all rather positive about it, the research at the
same time revealed that a significant number of problem gamblers were not, and
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most likely would never be, identified and confronted by the casino. It is also striking
that risk communications by, or dealing with, HC, positively evaluate the good inten-
tions and active engagement of problem gambling by HC, and virtually ignore the
actual effectiveness of this policy, as was the case with the Dutch Court of Audits
(Algemene-Rekenkamer 2011). From a risk governance perspective one could there-
fore argue that ‘the problem of the problem gambler . . . has become a highly productive
discursive object, and is not really a problem to be solved so much as a risk to be
managed’ (Cosgrave 2010, 115).
This discussion bears of course on the criteria that would determine whether a
program is effective or not. According to some authors self-exclusion programs can
lead to an improvement in behavior control and a reduction of harm amongst gamblers,
even if some people return to a casino while taking part in or shortly after a self-
exclusion program (Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, and Shaffer 2004; Ladouceur, Sylvain,
and Gosselin 2007). While I would not refute that an increase in awareness and partici-
pation in a self-exclusion program might in itself contribute to the reduction of gam-
bling harms, I would hold that a symmetrical assessment of the effectiveness should
not only address gamblers that take part in exclusion programs but should also
include the problem gamblers that do not participate in the program. This seems par-
ticularly relevant in cases where ‘responsibilization’ is used as an argument for liberal-
izing gambling corporations. After all, in that case risk management might
paradoxically lead to more risk taking.
6. Conclusion
Gambling regulators and operators commission research and hire scientific experts and
consultants to identify and measure problem gambling. The idea behind this is that
scientific methods will improve the management of gambling organizations, and thus
contribute to a better, i.e. a safer exploitation of commercial gambling. But does it
really work this way? As discussed in this article, gambling enterprises such as HC
apply scientific management principles for the development and evaluation of their
responsible gambling policy. In this process it became clear that positive science
offers only a limited basis for the management of problem gambling. All in all, three
paradoxes have been specified which account for the weaknesses of responsible gam-
bling: (a) the freedom paradox, which puts primary responsibility on the individual
gambler and undermines corporate control; (b) the objectivity paradox, which produces
the illusion that problem gambling can be brought under rational control; and (c) the
knowledge paradox, which addresses the limited effectiveness of responsible gambling
and causes reputational problems. While the freedom paradox and, to a lesser extent,
the objectivity paradox have been acknowledged in the field of gambling studies,
and might be countered with tougher exclusion policies and more sophisticated
measurement instruments, the knowledge paradox has hardly been acknowledged
and is much more alarming.
The paradox of risk management discussed here, makes clear that while science is
called upon to improve the control over gambling, it has to be admitted that science can
only identify and address a limited range of gambling problems. My conclusion is that
there is interplay between science and management that is part of, and contributes to,
the redefinition of casinos into responsibilized corporations. Responsibilized gambling
corporations are increasingly preoccupied not only with the management of problem
gambling, but also with the management of public expectations and perceptions
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toward a casino’s ability to manage risk. To the extent that casino corporations are
unable to provide convincing proof of effectiveness in countering problem gambling,
they remain vulnerable to allegations of merely deploying responsible gambling for
enhancing the reputation of their business.
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Notes
1. It should be noted that the approaches are overlapping and that in particular the all-
encompassing risk governance approach as outlined by Renn explicitly includes the
notion of an actor network, comprising ‘all those with a stake in the risk and its possible
outcomes – which could involve a large set of actors, such as national, regional and local
governments; different sectors of industry; regulators; NGOs; the media; and members of
the general public’ (Renn 2008, 354).
2. Interestingly, the first Dutch evaluation was not released for review to a wider audience,
although it has explicitly been used by HC and the Dutch Casinos Council to illustrate
the ‘effectiveness’ of the responsibility practice to the Dutch media and to Parliament.
The transparency and responsiveness regarding problem gambling of the Dutch casinos
should therefore, at that time, be regarded as still comparatively low.
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